Fundraising

Anti-Dilution Clause Example - What the Math Looks Like

The clause that sits quietly in your term sheet until your valuation drops - and then rewrites your cap table

- 12 min read

The Clause Founders Ignore Until It Is Too Late

Anti-dilution provisions sit in the middle of your term sheet and look harmless. They are not.

When your company raises money at a lower valuation than a prior round - what investors call a down round - this clause decides how much of your company you still own after the dust settles. The investor gets protected. The founder takes the hit. How big that hit is depends entirely on which version of the clause you signed.

Down rounds are not rare. Data from Morgan Lewis puts the share of down rounds at 23% in a recent quarter - the highest in five years. Separate data shows 32% of Series B and later financings experienced down rounds in recent quarters. You can be hit by this.

This article walks through anti-dilution clause examples with real numbers so you can see exactly what each type does to a cap table - and what to push for when you are sitting across from an investor.

What an Anti-Dilution Clause Does

When a company raises a new funding round at a lower price per share than a previous round, early investors who hold preferred stock get hurt. Their shares are worth less.

An anti-dilution clause repairs that damage. It does this by adjusting the price at which the earlier investor preferred stock converts into common stock. A lower conversion price means each preferred share converts into more common shares. More shares means the investor recovers some of their lost percentage ownership.

Who pays for those extra shares? Founders and common stockholders. The math is zero-sum. What the investor gains, someone else loses.

There are three main approaches: full ratchet, weighted average, and no anti-dilution protection at all. The NVCA model term sheet covers all three. In practice you will almost always see weighted average. Full ratchet is rare and punishing. No protection is a dream scenario for founders but a hard sell for most institutional investors.

Anti-Dilution Clause Example - Full Ratchet

Here is how it works with real numbers.

Suppose a VC invests $5 million for 1 million shares at $5 per share in your Series A. That implies a $5 per share conversion price for their preferred stock.

One year later, growth stalls. You need cash. The only term sheet you can get prices new shares at $2 per share - a down round.

Under full ratchet, the earlier investor conversion price is reset from $5 per share all the way down to $2 per share. Their original $5 million investment now converts as if they had paid $2 per share all along. That means their 1 million preferred shares now convert into 2.5 million common shares ($5M divided by $2 per share).

They did not invest a single extra dollar. They went from 1 million shares to 2.5 million shares by virtue of the clause alone. That 1.5 million extra shares came directly out of the founder and common shareholder pool.

The key detail: full ratchet triggers on even one share issued below the prior conversion price. It does not matter how tiny the down round is. One share sold at $1.99 reprices the entire prior round. That is what makes full ratchet a sledgehammer - it does not care about the size of the event that triggers it.

Full ratchet is essentially dead in institutional Series A investing today. Experienced founders push back on it and reputable VC funds largely do not demand it. But it still appears in smaller rounds or from less experienced investors. If you see it in a term sheet, negotiate hard to remove it or replace it with weighted average.

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Anti-Dilution Clause Example - Broad-Based Weighted Average

Broad-based weighted average (BBWA) is the market standard. It is more founder-friendly than full ratchet because it takes into account how large the down round is relative to the whole company - not just the price drop.

The formula, as documented in DLA Piper term sheet guidance and used in NVCA model term sheets, is:

CP2 = CP1 x (A + B) / (A + C)

That formula adjusts the conversion price downward - but only partially. The adjustment reflects both the lower price and how many new shares were issued. A small down round moves the needle less than a large one at the same lower price.

Step-by-Step BBWA Worked Example

A company has 1 million common shares outstanding. It raises Series A - 1 million new preferred shares at $1.00 per share. The preferred stock converts to common at a 1:1 ratio. Conversion price: $1.00. Total shares before the down round: 2 million.

Then comes the down round. Series B closes at $0.50 per share for 1 million new shares. Total proceeds: $500,000.

Plugging into the formula:

CP2 = $1.00 x (2,000,000 + $500,000 / $1.00) / (2,000,000 + 1,000,000)

CP2 = $1.00 x (2,500,000) / (3,000,000) = $0.8333

The Series A investor conversion price drops from $1.00 to $0.8333. The adjustment is partial, weighted by the size of the down round - not a full reset to $0.50 as full ratchet would require.

The investor 1 million preferred shares now convert at $0.8333 instead of $1.00. Divide the original $1M investment by the new conversion price: $1,000,000 / $0.8333 = roughly 1.2 million common shares. They picked up about 200,000 extra shares without paying anything more.

Under full ratchet at $0.50 per share, those same shares would convert the $1M into 2 million common shares - double the original count. BBWA produces 200,000 extra shares for the investor; full ratchet produces 1 million. Those 800,000 shares come out of the founder stake.

A Second BBWA Example With Larger Numbers

Take a company called NewCo. It raises $8 million at Series A with a pre-money valuation of $16 million. Combined founder shares and the options pool total 8 million shares. Investors receive 4 million preferred shares, convertible to common at $2.00 per share. Total shares: 12 million.

Series B is a down round. Five million new shares sell at $1.00 per share for total proceeds of $5 million. The pre-money value has dropped from $24 million to $12 million.

Using BBWA:

CP2 = $2.00 x (12,000,000 + ($5,000,000 / $2.00)) / (12,000,000 + 5,000,000)

CP2 = $2.00 x (14,500,000) / (17,000,000) = $1.7059

Rather than converting their $8 million of preferred stock into 4 million common shares, the Series A investor now converts at $1.7059. Their 4 million preferred shares become roughly 4.69 million common shares - about 690,000 extra shares without any additional investment.

Under full ratchet at $1.00 per share, they would have ended up with 8 million common shares. The BBWA approach cut that windfall gain by nearly 85%.

Broad-Based vs Narrow-Based - The Distinction That Matters

Weighted average comes in two flavors. The difference is what you count as A in the formula - the pre-round share count.

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Broad-based weighted average counts all outstanding shares on a fully diluted basis. That means common shares, preferred shares on an as-converted basis, outstanding options, warrants, and shares reserved but not yet issued under the stock option plan. The denominator in the formula is larger, which means the adjustment to the conversion price is smaller. Less adjustment means less dilution for the founder.

Narrow-based weighted average counts a smaller set - typically just common stock, or only shares currently convertible into common. That smaller denominator produces a bigger adjustment to the conversion price and more dilution for founders.

The broader the base, the better for founders. This is why founders should push specifically for broad-based, not just weighted average. Those two words make a material dollar difference at the cap table level.

In my experience reviewing institutional VC agreements, broad-based weighted average is the default. Narrow-based occasionally shows up in deals where investors have more leverage or where there is less experienced counsel on the founder side.

What No Anti-Dilution Protection Looks Like

The third option from the NVCA term sheet is no price-based anti-dilution protection. In this scenario, a down round hits the preferred investor the same way it hits everyone else. They absorb the loss without any adjustment to their conversion price.

This is the fairest outcome for founders and common stockholders. In my experience, institutional investors writing larger checks will push back hard on carrying the full down-round risk without any protection. Where no protection occasionally shows up: early pre-seed checks from angels with less negotiating leverage, or deals where a founder has strong competing term sheets.

The Carve-Outs You Need to Negotiate

Anti-dilution clauses typically do not apply to every single new share issuance. Certain events are carved out - meaning they do not trigger the conversion price adjustment even though new shares are being issued.

In every term sheet I review, the carve-outs include:

Beyond the standard list, additional carve-outs can be negotiated. Common examples include shares issued in connection with an acquisition, shares issued to equipment lessors, banks in debt financing arrangements, or strategic partners in collaboration deals.

Founders should read this section carefully. If you plan to issue shares as part of a strategic partnership and that issuance is not carved out, it could accidentally trigger anti-dilution protections for every prior investor - even though no traditional down round occurred. Getting a carve-out before closing is much easier than renegotiating after the fact.

Pay-to-Play - The Clause That Makes Investors Earn Their Protection

The pay-to-play provision is the fourth element of this ecosystem, and it gets skipped more often than it should.

Pay-to-play works alongside anti-dilution protections to change the incentive structure. The basic mechanic: an investor who does not participate in a subsequent round loses their anti-dilution protection for that round. They may also lose other preferred stock rights, depending on how the provision is written.

From a founder perspective, this is a useful tool. It stops investors from sitting out a down round - passively collecting the benefit of anti-dilution without committing more capital to the company. An investor who rode up, refuses to participate on the way down, and yet receives additional shares through the anti-dilution clause is getting a very one-sided deal.

Pay-to-play provisions are more likely to appear during difficult fundraising climates when investor reliability matters most. Founders with competing term sheets and some negotiating leverage can reasonably push for this provision. Expect pushback, but it is worth asking for.

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When Anti-Dilution Gets Waived

Anti-dilution rights are not set in stone. Investors can and do waive them, particularly when enforcing them would demotivate founders and hurt the investor own outcome.

The logic: if full ratchet is enforced in a down round and the founder is left with a 5% stake, they have little reason to keep working hard. The investor now owns a larger share of a company being led by someone with almost no financial upside. Some experienced investors recognize this and choose to renegotiate - converting to common, accepting dilution, and giving the founder enough equity to care about the outcome again.

A requisite amount of voting power from prior investors can typically waive anti-dilution protections even after a down round closes. Founders should know this lever exists, even if they cannot count on it being pulled.

Future investors can also negotiate away prior investors anti-dilution protections as part of closing a new round. This can work in the founder favor but can also create conflict between investor classes that delays or derails the round.

Anti-Dilution and Convertible Notes - A Different Animal

Traditional price-based anti-dilution provisions are generally not found in convertible notes or SAFEs. Those instruments convert into preferred shares following a priced financing round. The protection they carry comes in a different form - through valuation caps and discount rates built into the note itself.

A valuation cap on a SAFE acts as a form of anti-dilution protection. If the next priced round is at a high valuation, the SAFE holder converts at the lower capped valuation and effectively gets more shares per dollar invested. Structurally similar to what anti-dilution does for preferred stock - but the mechanism is different and is set at issuance, not triggered by a subsequent down round.

If your cap table includes both SAFE notes and priced preferred rounds, map out exactly what happens in a down-round scenario to each instrument class before you raise your next round. The interactions can be non-obvious.

The Negotiation Moves That Work Right Now

Founders who understand this clause well enough to negotiate it tend to do a few specific things.

Push for broad-based over narrow-based. This is the single highest-impact word change in the entire clause. Broad-based includes the full option pool in the denominator, which dampens the anti-dilution adjustment. In my experience, institutional investors will agree to broad-based without a fight because it has become the market standard.

Negotiate carve-outs before you need them. Think ahead about what shares you might issue in the next 12 to 18 months beyond a standard fundraise. Strategic partnerships, acquisition currency, equity grants to key advisors - carve these out now, before signing.

Set an activation threshold. Some term sheets can be structured so that anti-dilution only kicks in for substantial valuation drops, not minor ones. This protects against triggering the clause on a small bridge round that is technically a tiny discount to the prior round price.

Ask about sunset provisions. These limit the duration of anti-dilution protections, ending them after a set timeframe or once specific milestones are met. Harder to get, but worth asking for in earlier rounds when you have more negotiating power.

Add pay-to-play. If you have negotiating power, make anti-dilution contingent on investor participation in future rounds. This aligns the investor protection with continued commitment to the company.

The bigger picture: high valuations and aggressive anti-dilution are a dangerous combination. A company that raises at a stretched valuation is more likely to face a down round. That down round then triggers anti-dilution with a bigger price gap to cover. A modest, defensible valuation with broad-based weighted average is a safer structure. A headline-grabbing number paired with full ratchet terms creates the conditions for that danger.

Model It Before You Sign

The right time to understand your anti-dilution clause is before you sign - not when a down round is already in progress. Running a simple cap table model with a hypothetical down-round scenario takes about 30 minutes and shows you exactly what each clause type does to your ownership and voting control.

Inputs you need: your current fully diluted share count, conversion prices by series, the size and price of the hypothetical down round. Plug those into the BBWA formula and run the full-ratchet version alongside it. The difference between those two outputs is the dollar value of the negotiation you are about to have.

Founders who understand the actual numbers in their cap table negotiate from a completely different position than founders who are relying only on their attorney to translate terms on the fly. Both things should happen simultaneously - but doing the math yourself means you know exactly what is at stake when someone tries to rush you past the anti-dilution section of a term sheet.

If you are raising right now and want to stress-test your cap table against a down-round scenario before you sign, working with operators who have closed these rounds is the fastest way to get clarity. Learn about Galadon Gold - direct coaching from people who have built and sold companies and negotiated these terms firsthand.

Quick Reference - The Three Types Side by Side

TypeHow It WorksWho It FavorsHow Common
Full RatchetResets conversion price to the exact down-round price, regardless of round sizeInvestor (strongly)Rare - mostly smaller or less experienced investors
Broad-Based Weighted AveragePartially adjusts conversion price based on round size and price, using fully diluted share countBalanced - more founder-friendlyStandard for institutional Series A and beyond
Narrow-Based Weighted AverageSame formula but uses a smaller share count, producing a bigger adjustmentInvestor (moderately)Less common - occasionally negotiated by aggressive investors
No ProtectionPreferred investors absorb the down round alongside everyone elseFounderRare - mostly angel or pre-seed deals

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Frequently Asked Questions

What triggers an anti-dilution clause?

An anti-dilution clause is triggered when a company issues new shares at a price per share lower than the conversion price paid by an earlier investor. This is called a down round. The clause then adjusts the earlier investor conversion price downward so they receive more common shares when they eventually convert their preferred stock.

What is the difference between full ratchet and weighted average anti-dilution?

Full ratchet resets the earlier investor conversion price all the way down to the new lower price, regardless of how small the down round is. Weighted average adjusts the conversion price only partially, based on both the new lower price and the size of the down round relative to total shares outstanding. Weighted average is far more common and much less damaging to founders.

Is broad-based weighted average better for founders than narrow-based?

Yes. Broad-based weighted average includes all outstanding shares on a fully diluted basis - options, warrants, and convertible securities - in the denominator of the formula. That larger denominator produces a smaller adjustment to the conversion price, which means less dilution for founders and common stockholders. Narrow-based uses a smaller share count and produces a bigger adjustment.

Do anti-dilution clauses apply to SAFE notes or convertible notes?

Traditional price-based anti-dilution provisions are generally not found in convertible notes or SAFEs. Those instruments use valuation caps and discount rates as their form of protection, which serve a similar function but work differently. The anti-dilution mechanics described in this article apply specifically to priced preferred stock rounds.

What is a carve-out in an anti-dilution clause?

A carve-out is an exception written into the anti-dilution clause that specifies certain share issuances will not trigger the anti-dilution adjustment. Standard carve-outs include employee stock options, shares issued on conversion of existing preferred stock, stock splits, and shares issued in connection with strategic transactions or acquisitions. Founders should negotiate carve-outs for any share issuances they anticipate making in the near term.

Can anti-dilution protections be waived after they are triggered?

Yes. A requisite number of preferred stockholders can vote to waive anti-dilution protections even after a down round has occurred. Experienced investors sometimes choose to waive enforcement voluntarily when enforcing the clause would so severely dilute founders that it destroys their motivation - which would ultimately hurt the investor outcome too.

What is a pay-to-play provision and how does it relate to anti-dilution?

A pay-to-play provision requires investors to participate in subsequent funding rounds in order to keep their anti-dilution protection. If an investor sits out a down round, their anti-dilution rights for that round do not apply, and they may also lose other preferred stock privileges. For founders, this is a useful negotiating tool because it aligns investor protection with continued financial commitment to the company.

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